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“not Obamacare”; indeed, he had gained concessions from the Obama administration allowing him to 
write conservative requirements into the program. His Republican colleagues—who controlled both 
houses of the legislature—supported his proposal, based partly on polling showing widespread voter 
approval. And yet none of this was enough. 
An advocacy group funded by the billionaire Koch brothers, Americans for Prosperity (AFP), sent field 
organizers into the state, ran weeks of advertising, and staged demonstrations insisting that any 
Medicaid expansion whatsoever amounted to “a vote for Obamacare.” Republican caucus chair Glen 
Casada termed AFP’s campaign “politics of intimidation.” But it worked; the governor’s bill was defeated. 
Declaring victory, an AFP spokesman warned that “other governors [should] look at Tennessee as an 
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Americans’ economic lives. How could an outside advocacy group overturn the will of elected officials 
and their constituents? What led a corporate-backed group to undermine its Republican allies? Why would 
the Koch brothers, whose primary interests are in the oil industry, care enough about Medicaid to bankroll 
this type of campaign? And finally, if corporate lobbies have the power to do what they did in Tennessee, 
what else could they do? In what other ways might they be trying to rewrite the rules that govern our 
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In answering these questions, this book aims to show how America’s most powerful corporate lobbies are 
working to remake the country’s economy in ways that will affect all Americans profoundly—and yet are 
largely invisible to most of us. Understanding these forces’ legislative agenda is essential to 
comprehending America’s current political and economic trajectory. Because this agenda has been 
enacted in state legislatures rather 4han the U.S. Congress, it is state-level initiatives that form the subject 
of this book. 
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A CORPORATE POLITICAL AGENDA 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
In January 2015, Tennessee’s Republican governor, Bill Haslam, unveiled a proposal 
to expand his state’s Medicaid program to provide health insurance to two hundred 
thousand low-income residents. At the time, Haslam was at the peak of his power: 
he had just won reelection with 70 percent of the vote and had been named to 
head the Republican Governors Association. Haslam insisted that his plan was “not 
Obamacare”; indeed, he had gained concessions from the Obama administration 
allowing him to write conservative requirements into the program. His Repub­
lican colleagues—who controlled both houses o f the legislature— supported 
his proposal, based partly on polling showing widespread voter approval. And yet 
none of this was enough.
An advocacy group funded by the billionaire Koch brothers, Americans for 
Prosperity (AFP), sent field organizers into the state, ran weeks of advertising, 
and staged demonstrations insisting that any Medicaid expansion whatsoever 
amounted to “a vote for Obamacare.” Republican caucus chair Glen Casada 
termed AFP’s campaign “politics o f intimidation.” But it worked; the governor’s 
bill was defeated. Declaring victory, an AFP spokesman warned that “other gov­
ernors [should] look at Tennessee as an example.” 1
The Tennessee experience raises important questions about American poli­
tics and the forces that shape Americans’ economic lives. How could an outside 
advocacy group overturn the will o f elected officials and their constituents? What 
led a corporate-backed group to undermine its Republican allies? Why would the 
Koch brothers, whose primary interests are in the oil industry, care enough about
1
2 INTRODUCTION
Medicaid to bankroll this type of campaign? And finally, if corporate lobbies have 
the power to do what they did in Tennessee, what else could they do? In what 
other ways might they be trying to rewrite the rules that govern our economy?
In answering these questions, this book aims to show how America’s most 
powerful corporate lobbies are working to remake the country’s economy in ways 
that will affect all Americans profoundly—and yet are largely invisible to most 
of us. Understanding these forces’ legislative agenda is essential to comprehend­
ing America’s current political and economic trajectory. Because this agenda has 
been enacted in state legislatures rather 4han the U.S. Congress, it is state-level 
initiatives that form the subject of this book.
The United States is an economy in decline, with an increasing number of Ameri­
cans unable to support their families at a minimally decent standard of living. In just 
three years, the post-2008 Great Recession erased two decades of growth in average 
household income. But the larger concern is a longer-term trend: the dismantling of 
the New Deal policies that created a booming middle class for several decades in the 
mid-twentieth century. In the new economy, decline—gradual but relentless—has 
become the new normal for an increasing share of the country.
This is reflected in rising economic inequality over the past four decades. 
Income and wealth have become increasingly concentrated, while tens of millions 
of Americans find themselves unable to attain the standard of living reached by 
comparable workers a generation or two earlier. The economy has been slowly 
restructured along lines that steer the bulk of gains into the hands of investors 
and upper management. For the past fifty years, the share of national income that 
goes to employees— rather than investors— has been steadily shrinking; by 2010, 
labor’s share had reached the lowest point ever recorded.2
The most common explanations for these trends focus on globalization or 
technology, both of which have indeed contributed to rising inequality. What this 
book demonstrates, however, is that growing inequality and increased hardship 
for American workers are also the result of an intentional policy agenda pursued 
by the largest and most powerful lobbies in the country—those representing the 
nation’s biggest corporations. In fact, that agenda has broadened rapidly, and 
been pursued with ever shaper ambition, in just the past few years.
The Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision ushered in a new legislative era, 
shaped by the impact of unlimited corporate spending on politics.3 That fall’s elec­
tions were the first conducted under the new rules, and they brought dramatic change. 
Eleven state governments switched from Democratic or divided control to unified 
Republican control of the governorship and both houses of the legislature. Since these 
lawmakers took office in early 2011, the United States has seen an unprecedented wave 
of legislation aimed at lowering labor standards and slashing public services.
The best-known effort came in Wisconsin, where the newly elected Republi­
can governor, Scott Walker, pushed through legislation that effectively eliminated
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the right to collective bargaining for his state’s 175,000 public employees.4 Yet 
what happened in Wisconsin was part of a much broader pattern. In the five 
years following Citizens United, bills restricting public employees’ collective-bar- 
gaining rights were adopted in fifteen states.5 In the same period, twelve states 
passed laws restricting the minimum wage, four eased limits on child labor, and 
nineteen imposed new caps on unemployment benefits.6
Many of these bills have been the subject of intensive reporting and debate. 
For the most part, however, journalists and scholars have focused on one or two 
specific bills, treating them as the product of local politics or a response to local 
economic conditions. This book, by contrast, identifies and assesses the corpo­
rate economic policy agenda as a whole. It provides the first comprehensive anal­
ysis of the goals o f America’s most powerful lobbies as they have been pursued 
in the fifty state legislatures in the years following Citizens United. The book thus 
also provides a context for making sense of federal legislative debates under the 
Trump administration, as the corporate lobbies seek to advance the same agenda 
in the halls of Congress.
At the heart of this activism are the country’s premier business lobbies— the 
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 
and the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)— along with the 
AFP and industry-specific groups such as the National Grocers Association and 
National Restaurant Association. I have tracked all bills that were enacted with 
the support of one or more of these organizations, in all fifty states, across a 
wide range of labor, employment, and economic policy issues. This includes not 
only restrictions on public- and private-sector unions but also legislation regard­
ing the minimum wage, child labor, wage theft, tipped employees, construction 
wages, occupational safety, job discrimination, employee misclassification, over­
time pay, unemployment insurance, budgetary retrenchment, and privatization 
of public services. In all, this book provides a comprehensive account of corpo­
rate political action on thirty separate but interrelated aspects of policy govern­
ing labor, employment, and public services.
When we examine this full range of legislation, certain things come into 
focus that are impossible to see when analyzing any particular bill. For starters, 
there is the sheer similarity of the legislation— nearly identical bills introduced 
in cookie-cutter fashion in states across the country. This highlights the extent 
to which state politics has become nationalized, with different states’ legislation 
originating from a common source in national advocacy organizations.
Moreover, the corporate vision itself becomes clearer when all its components 
are brought together. For example, when lobbyists argue in one state against link­
ing the minimum wage to the rate of inflation, the debate may seem to revolve 
around the pros and cons of indexing. But when one sees the same lobbyists 
working elsewhere to abolish the minimum wage outright, to lower construction
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wages, to expand the use of teenage labor, or to force the unemployed to take 
lower-wage jobs, the local fight about indexing becomes just one feature of a 
larger tableau.
This book’s purpose is to reproduce that tableau. By synthesizing corporate 
lobbying efforts across diverse issues and all fifty states, it is possible to show 
the sum, not just the parts, of a cohesive strategic agenda— and thus to see how 
America’s most powerful forces are seeking to reshape its economy, society, and 
politics.
The Rise of the One Percent Economy
In absolute terms— and certainly relative to much of the world— plenty of Amer­
ica’s 320 million people are doing well. However, what was once a widespread and 
realistic ambition— not to be rich, but to live a good life, free of economic anxiety, 
and to be able to provide one’s children with opportunities for advancement— has 
become unachievable for most.
What has changed is the diversion of a growing share of income and wealth 
into the hands of those who already have the most. America’s golden age— the 
three decades following the Second World War—was a time of broadly shared 
prosperity. The country still cycled through good times and bad, but when the 
economy grew, most people benefited. In the three decades from 1947 to 1979, 
every segment of the population gained ground, but income growth was actually 
faster for the poorest households than for the richest. Although the rich grew 
richer, the country grew slightly more equal. Since then, exactly the opposite 
pattern has taken hold. For more than three decades, income has been radically 
skewed toward the wealthiest, with 40 percent of U.S. households experiencing 
stagnant or falling earnings (figure I .l) .7
Underlying the growth in inequality is a breakdown in the relationship 
between productivity and wages. When workers produce more output per hour— 
whether through greater effort, better organization, new technology, or higher 
education— corporate profits grow and real wage increases become possible. For 
the first three postwar decades, when productivity improved, everyone gained. 
Indeed, average wage increases tracked productivity almost exactly: from 1948 to 
1973, productivity increased by 96.7 percent, and hourly compensation for pro­
duction and nonsupervisory workers (80 percent of the workforce) rose by 91.3 
percent. Over the past forty years, however, productivity has been divorced from 
wages, as shown in figure 1.2. From 1973 to 2013, productivity increased by 74.4 
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FIGURE 1.1. Real family income growth, 1947-2012.
Source: Colin Gordon, "Growing Together, Growing Apart," Working Economics Blog, Economic Policy Institute, 
October 4, 2013, http://www.epi.org/blog/growing-growing.
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an economy where, for many millions of Americans, it is possible to work both 
harder and smarter and still not get ahead.
With employees no longer able to secure their share of productivity gains, 
Americans’ standard of living has slowly deteriorated. Particularly in the two- 
thirds of the labor market where jobs do not require a college degree, “family- 
wage” jobs have grown ever scarcer. Nine of the ten occupations projected to 
add the most jobs in the coming decade are low-wage, with an average sal­
ary exactly equal to the poverty threshold for a family of four.9 The past four 
decades have been particularly hard on men. From 1979 to 2014, real wages 
declined for the bottom 60 percent of male workers— meaning that seventy 
million men in 2014 were working for less than their fathers or grandfathers
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FIGURE 1.2. Productivity and hourly compensation of production and non- 
supervisory workers, 1948-2013.
Source: Analysis of data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data are for 
wages and benefits of production/nonsupervisory workers in the private sector and net productivity of the entire 
economy. Net productivity is the growth of output of goods and services less depreciation per hour. Reproduced 
from Larry Mishel, Elise Gould, and Josh Bivens, "Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts," Economic Policy Institute, 
January 6, 2015, http://www.epi.org/files/2013/wage-stagnation-in-nine-charts.pdf.
earned.10 The total income of American families has done better, increas­
ing slightly over this period.11 But this was made possible only by a dramatic 
increase in the number of hours that parents— particularly women— spent at 
work. As a result, the average middle-class family now works 280 hours per 
year— the equivalent of seven additional weeks of full-time work— more than 
they would have in 1979.12
The erosion of the labor market has put an increasing number of people at 
risk of poverty. In any given year, one in seven Americans lives below the official 
poverty line. But the number living close to the edge is much greater: fully 40 
percent of American adults will spend at least one year in poverty during their 
prime working years.13 For the first time in fifty years, in 2013 a majority of stu­
dents in American public schools lived in low-income families.14 Most disturbing 
of all, for some of the population, life has been getting shorter. White people still 
live longer than blacks in America, but because they had greater access to living- 
wage jobs in midcentury, they also had the most to lose, not only in economic 
terms but also, it appears, in terms of physical well-being. From 1990 to 2008, life 
expectancy for white American women without a high school diploma fell by five
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years and that of men by three years. The exact cause of shrinking life spans is 
not known, but researchers speculate that it may reflect the growing number of 
adults without health insurance during this period.15
Even for middle-class families with growing incomes, these gains are often insuf­
ficient to offset dramatic price increases for the core components— education, 
health care, and retirement security—that traditionally define a middle-class life­
style. The average cost o f family health insurance, for example, increased by more 
than 80 percent over the past ten years.16 Thus, even for those whose earnings have 
improved modestly, the goals of sending one’s children to college and not having to 
worry about poverty in old age have become increasingly difficult to square.
The economic decline experienced by America’s working- and middle-class 
families is only one side of the story. The other side is skyrocketing wealth for 
those at the top— even after the 2008 crisis. For the first time ever, in 2012 more 
than half o f all income in America went to the richest 10 percent of the popula­
tion, a degree of inequality surpassing even that of the late 1920s.17 While the net 
worth of the bottom half o f households evaporated in 2011-14, that of the rich­
est 1 percent grew by an average of $5 million per family.18 Indeed, one historian 
of oligarchy notes that the richest four hundred individuals in the United States 
now exercise a degree of influence over society comparable to that of the rulers 
of ancient Rome.19
Growing economic inequality has, in turn, created increased political inequality. 
While business has always enjoyed outsized political influence, its voice has grown 
even more dominant in recent years. Elections for public office have become dra­
matically more expensive, rendering politicians all the more dependent on those 
with the resources to fund their campaigns.20 The increasing concentration of 
wealth has produced a growing class of megadonors prepared to spend enormous 
sums to influence outcomes. And finally, the progressive loosening of campaign 
finance regulations— culminating in the Citizens United decision— has enabled 
corporations and the wealthy to spend unlimited amounts on elections, and to do 
so secretly. The intersection of these three factors has dramatically increased the 
political influence o f those at the top of the economy.
At the federal level, the domination of campaigns by a handful of megadonors 
has been so sudden— more than 60 percent of all personal campaign contribu­
tions in 2012 came from less than 0.5 percent of the population— as to render 
former superstars suddenly obsolete.21 In his 2000 and 2004 elections, George 
W. Bush built what was heralded at the time as the most powerful fund-raising 
machine in American political history, constructed around teams of bundlers 
dubbed “Pioneers,’’who each committed to raise $100,000 from his or her circle of 
friends. This elite fund-raising corps was showered with appreciation, including
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twenty-four ambassadorships and two cabinet posts. By the time Bush’s younger 
brother began his own presidential campaign, however, the Pioneers had become 
too small to matter. One businesswoman who had raised $1 million for the 2004 
Bush reelection campaign complained in the spring of 2015 that none of the 
presidential candidates had contacted her. “They are only going to people who 
are multi-millionaires and billionaires.. . .  [T]he people I talk to . . . just don’t 
count anymore.”22
So, too, political spending was heavily tilted toward corporations long before 
Citizens United; on average, from 2000 to 2010, business typically outspent labor 
unions by ten to one in federal elections.23 In theory, Citizens United allowed for 
unlimited spending by both corporations and unions. In reality, however, the 
resource imbalance between these groups is so extreme as to render the com­
parison meaningless. The annual revenue o f Fortune 500 companies alone is 350 
times that of the labor movement.24 By 2010, unions had already reached their 
limit of possible spending, with the AFL-CIO forced to cut its political advertis­
ing budget and limit itself to “incumbency protection,” rather than competing 
for open seats.25
Corporate spending, by contrast, grew dramatically. Advocacy organizations 
spent just over $140 million on the presidential and congressional elections in 
2008. Four years later, advocacy organizations spent $1 billion on federal elec­
tions, the great bulk of it from businesspeople and corporate organizations.26 
Both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Club for Growth more than dou­
bled their spending from 2008 to 2012. In addition, a slew of new corporate- 
funded advocacy organizations appeared during this period. Taken together, 
spending by the major corporate-funded groups was more than six times higher 
in 2012 than in 2008.27
In addition to the overall increase in spending, the 2010 elections marked the 
beginning of a fundamental shift in control of electoral politics. As recently as 
2008, a team of political scientists at George Washington University, James Madi­
son University and the University of California published The Party Decides, a 
sophisticated account of political parties’ controlling role in the selection o f pres­
idential nominees.28 But this analysis has quickly become outdated. In 2016, both 
the Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders campaigns challenged the role of party 
elites, with the GOP leadership rendered nearly powerless in the face of Trump’s 
offensive. In down-ballot races, however, the power of party officials has been 
supplanted not by insurgent candidate campaigns but by private, corporate- 
funded advocacy groups. For many longtime donors, the ability to contribute 
secretly to private organizations offers strong incentive to eschew regular cam­
paign contributions. Furthermore, such organizations can do things that parties 
and candidates cannot. By law, for example, candidates and parties are prohibited
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from “coordinating” with outside groups, which forces campaigns to operate in 
the dark regarding the timing, location, and volume of allied activity. In 2010, 
the GOP found a solution to this problem: the campaign’s own advertising plans, 
previously treated as a closely guarded secret, would now be publicly distributed. 
Knowing the campaign’s planned advertising buys, the outside groups could then 
freely coordinate a plan to supplement this effort without fear of duplication. The 
political director for Karl Rove’s American Crossroads organization explained 
that “the [party] committees . . .  make their [advertising] buys earlier.. . .  That 
research then helps us on the outside have some sense of where to go.”29 The com­
bination of campaign insiders and outside operatives thus effectively defeated the 
ban on coordination—but it is now the outside groups, not party officials, who 
are in position to drive the coordinated strategy.
Beyond advertising, the new private groups have taken on a growing array of 
responsibilities that had previously been the exclusive preserve of political par­
ties. When Rove launched American Crossroads/Crossroads Grassroots Policy 
Strategies—just months after the Citizens United decision— its declared purpose 
included much of what had previously constituted core GOP activities. Rove’s 
group would “research, test, educate, and galvanize citizens on high-resonance 
issues affecting the government and economy . . . shape citizen attitudes with 
hard-hitting issue advocacy, and . . . build a national grassroots network of 
center-right supporters who respond to our issue agenda and mobilize them to 
advocate effectively for policy change . . . [using] list exchanges [and] micro­
targeting techniques.”30 While Rove’s operation worked on list building, messaging, 
and communications, others were focused closer to the ground. Americans for 
Prosperity and FreedomWorks built their own field organizations— identifying 
local community leaders, recruiting and training thousands of volunteers, and 
running sophisticated voter-contact campaigns. In 2010, the Kochs financed 
three separate multicity bus tours; the “Spending Revolt” tour alone sponsored 
nearly 140 rallies, each featuring a GOP candidate and local Tea Party leader.31 In 
2012, Mitt Romney’s single largest phone-banking operation was run by AFP.32 
A Koch-funded organization now has joint control over the Republican Party’s 
electronic voter file— the heart of any field campaign. And in preparation for 
the 2016 elections, the Kochs established their own candidate-recruitment firm, 
as well as dedicated field organizations aimed at Latino voters, veterans, and 
millennials.33
Thus, it is not simply that politicians have become more dependent on corpo­
rate campaign contributions. Rather, the very machinery of elections has increas­
ingly shifted from party to private hands. It is this— the capacity to develop, 
poll-test, and air advertisements; to recruit, train, and deploy local volunteers; 
and to tap sophisticated databases to mobilize sympathetic activists on specific
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issues—that enabled Americans for Prosperity to beat a unified Republican party 
in Tennessee. The political scientists Theda Skocpol and Alexander Hertel- 
Fernandez write that “by the mid-1990s, the Chamber of Commerce”— along 
with NAM and NFIB— was simply “an adjunct of the GOP.”34 If this was true 
twenty years ago, it is no longer. Corporate efforts to exert greater control over 
policy decisions have been building for decades. But it has now become impos­
sible to portray the party itself as the prime determinant of electoral and legisla­
tive outcomes: in a post-Citizens United world, the relationship between parties 
and “their” outside supporters has been turned on its head.
Corporate Lobbies and the Conservative Base
Since the emergence in 2009 of the Tea Party movement, commentators have rou­
tinely portrayed the conservative activist base as the sorcerer’s apprentice: an untamed 
force that has increasingly taken control of the GOP. Following the 2012 elections, 
the New York Times described “Republican-on-Republican warfare,” as major donors 
united to block Tea Party extremists from winning party nominations for federal 
office.35 The Washington Post spoke of GOP leaders being “in thrall” to the Tea Party, 
unable to buck conservative activists on critical issues like immigration reform.36 
House Speaker John Boehner’s forced resignation in the fall of 2015 was widely seen 
as a victory of the rank and file over entrenched interests. According to CNN, he and 
other GOP leaders, such as House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, “succumbed to the 
storm of conservatives angry at a party leadership they felt was betraying its base.”37 
The election of Donald Trump was likewise cast as a revolt by the party’s base against 
its donor class and establishment leaders. Indeed, Trump’s candidacy was vigorously 
opposed by all the major corporate lobbies, and his election marked a setback for 
them. Nevertheless, they remain the single most influential force shaping Congres­
sional legislation, and, at the state level, the base has never posed a significant obstacle 
to the corporate legislative agenda. On the contrary, corporate strategists played a 
decisive role in creating the Tea Party38 and have been largely successful at channeling 
its activism in ways that serve their interests.
As the investigative reporter Lee Fang brilliantly recounts, the Tea Party arose 
from a long process of trial and error, led primarily by the Koch brothers and 
real estate mogul Howie Rich, who for at least a decade had sought to ignite 
a grassroots antitax movement branded with the symbols of the Boston Tea 
Party.39 This is not to say that the Tea Party is simply a fabrication of corporate 
power brokers. Participants’ convictions are genuine. But it was the corporate 
money that brought its members together; paid for their buses, stages, listservs, 
sound equipment, and meeting space; trained and equipped their activists; and
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broadcast their advertisements. The corporate-backed FreedomWorks even paid 
Glenn Beck $1 million to read “embedded content” in his newscasts.40 Without 
such support, the Tea Party’s constituency of disgruntled conservatives would 
have remained a marginal force in national debates.
From the beginning, the major corporate organizations that helped create the 
Tea Party—including Dick Armey’s FreedomWorks and the Kochs’ Americans 
for Prosperity—sought to harness populist impulses to corporate ends. In 2009, 
when Georgia legislators considered a dollar-per-pack increase in cigarette taxes 
to close the state’s budget deficit, Philip Morris paid Grover Norquist’s Americans 
for Tax Reform to organize a Tea Party protest in opposition. In 2010, Freedom- 
Works organized rallies to oppose the federal government’s requirement that BP 
set aside $20 billion to cover damage from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.41 
Neither issue appears to have been a high priority for many Tea Party activists, 
but once well-resourced corporate-funded operatives began organizing around 
them, it was possible to convince the rank and file that both were part of the 
broader agenda o f antigovernment anger.
As Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson note in their landmark study, 
many genuine and sophisticated activists within the Tea Party were openly skep­
tical about the agenda of big-money sponsors.42 Yet for the most part, the initia­
tives that actually have become law—backed by Tea Party legislators— have been 
those that serve corporate interests.
From the start, the corporate strategists strove to marginalize Tea Party activ­
ists’ passion for social conservatism. In 2010, activists worked with Freedom- 
works head Dick Armey to craft the “Contract from America,” presented as a 
statement of core principles to which Tea Party-backed candidates were required 
to adhere. And yet every one of the core principles addressed economic concerns, 
with no mention whatsoever of same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration, or 
guns.43 “Social issues may matter to particular individuals, b u t . . .  the movement 
should be agnostic,” argued the attorney who spearheaded this process. “This is 
a movement that rose [around] . . .  economic conservative ideology. To include 
social issues would be beside the point.”44
To be sure, the conservative base is not easily controlled, as was made manifest 
by the Trump campaign. Corporate backers have been forced to tolerate a degree 
of allegiance to social conservatism and to back off certain proposals in the face 
of economic populism in order to maintain the right-wing alliance. With the elec­
tion of President Trump, corporate advocates were forced to relinquish— at least 
temporarily—their quests for a Pacific Rim free trade treaty and privatizing Social 
Security. On the whole, however, the legislative record indicates that it is the cor­
porate lobbies, rather than the Tea Party’s activists or Trump’s grassroots army, that 
retain the most power to shape state laws. This is true even in Washington, D.C.,
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where Republican senators and congresspeople remain overwhelmingly depen­
dent on corporate largesse; it is truer still in the state legislatures.
Who Are the Corporate Lobbies?
No bill becomes a law without a coalition of political actors behind it. Most of the 
legislation described in this book— attacks on unions, the minimum wage, and 
public services— has been advanced by a combination of Republican politicians 
and conservative advocacy groups. For some parts o f this coalition, the primary 
goal is partisan advantage. Republican strategists such as Grover Norquist have 
long identified public employees, labor unions, and trial lawyers as three “pillars” 
of the Democratic Party: unions and lawyers provide campaign funds, and pub­
lic employees provide the army of volunteers who make phone calls and knock 
on doors in support of “big government” Democrats.45 It is no accident that the 
hardest-fought antiunion campaigns have been waged in so-called battleground 
states. Cutting off union funds and campaign volunteers in toss-up states such 
as Michigan, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Ohio may alter control of the federal 
government. As Wisconsin’s Senate Majority Leader forecast in 2011, “ If we win 
this battle [with public employee unions], and the money is not there under the 
auspices of the unions, certainly what you’re going to find is President Obama 
is going to have a much . . .  more difficult time getting elected and winning the 
state of Wisconsin.”46
But behind the Republican operatives, the most important force driving 
this agenda forward is a network of extremely wealthy individuals and corpo­
rations— the key organizations whose agenda this book addresses. All three of 
the country’s largest corporate lobbies— the Chamber of Commerce, National 
Association of Manufacturers, and the National Federation of Independent 
Business— are active in state political debates.47 In recent years, the Koch-funded 
Americans for Prosperity has joined them as one of the largest and most active 
forces in state politics. In addition, several industry and employer associations— 
representing grocers, restaurateurs, and builders, for example— are active in state 
politics, either directly or through their membership in larger organizations. 
Above all, the corporate agenda is coordinated through the American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC).
While these organizations primarily work in tandem with GOP leaders, they 
should not be understood simply as a component of the Republican Party or 
even the broader conservative movement. The corporate lobbies have not hesi­
tated to pursue their own interests where these conflict with those of party 
leaders, even when doing so jeopardizes Republican legislative seats. Likewise,
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their agenda sometimes confounds party lines— most importantly on education 
reform, where traditional Democratic supporters in the technology and finance 
industries work in concert with Republican legislators and conservative corpo­
rate groups.
ALEC, the most important national organization advancing the corporate 
agenda at the state level, brings together two thousand member legislators (one- 
quarter of all state lawmakers, including many state senate presidents and House 
Speakers) and the country’s largest corporations to formulate and promote busi­
ness-friendly legislation (see table I.l).48 According to the group’s promotional 
materials, it convenes bill-drafting committees— often at posh resorts— in which 
“both corporations and legislators have a voice and a vote in shaping policy.” 
Thus, state legislators with little time, staff, or expertise are able to introduce fully 
formed and professionally supported bills. The organization claims to introduce 
eight hundred to one thousand bills each year in the fifty state legislatures, with 
20 percent becoming law.49
Ultimately, the “exchange” that ALEC facilitates is between corporate donors 
and state legislators. The corporations pay ALEC’s expenses and contribute to 
legislators’ campaigns; in return, legislators carry the corporate agenda into their 
statehouses.50 Member corporations also fund the ALEC-affiliated State Policy 
Network, whose procorporate think tanks produce policy papers in support of 
model legislation.51 In the first decade of this century, ALEC’s leading corporate 
backers contributed more than $370 million to state elections, and over one hun­
dred laws each year based on ALEC’s model bills were enacted.52 Through this 
network, corporate lobbyists have established a well-funded, highly effective 
operation that combines legislative drafting, electoral politics, lobbying, grass­
roots activism, and policy promotion.
Both the Chamber o f Commerce and ALEC often pursue initiatives that 
directly benefit the bottom line o f particular corporate members. The Cham­
ber advertises itself as the representative o f American business generally, but 
a much smaller circle of very large corporations accounts for most of its bud­
get and dominates its advocacy agenda.53 In 2009-10, for example, the health 
insurance industry provided more than $100 million to the Chamber to advo­
cate against health care reform.54 All three of the world’s leading emitters of 
greenhouse gases— Chevron, ExxonMobil, and BP— are affiliated with the 
Chamber, which in turn lobbies against regulation of coal mining, fracking, 
and C 0 2  emissions.55 The Chamber has also received significant funding from 
tobacco companies and is engaged in an international effort to defeat anti­
smoking laws.56
At the state level, much of ALEC’s activity is similarly targeted at issues of direct 
financial concern to member companies. In one outreach message to potential
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TABLE 1.1 American Legislative Exchange Council, select current and recent past 
members
Abbott Laboratories Darden R estauran ts M icrosoft
Aflac Dell Mobil
Air T ransport A ssociation Dow  Chem ical M onsanto
Alcoa Dow  Corn ing M otorola
Allergan Duke Energy N estle
Altria G roup Dupont N ew s Corporation
A m azon.com eBay NFIB
American Association of Health Plans Eli Lilly N orth rop  Grum m an
Am erican Bankers Association Enron Pacific G a s  and Electric
Am erican Cyanam id E xpress Scripts Peabody Energy
Am gen Exxon Mobil PepsiCo
Am oco Facebook Pfizer
Am  way FedEx PhRM A
Anheuser-Busch Ford M otor C o. Procter & Gam ble
Archer D aniels  M idland G E IC O Prudential
A rthur Andersen Genera l Electric Raytheon
AT&T General M otors Sallie  M ae
Bank of Am erica G e o  G roup Scantron
Baxter H ealthcare Georgia-Pacific Schering-Plough
B ayer Corp G laxoS m ithK line S eagram  & S o n s
Bell Atlantic Google Shell Oil
Bell Helicopter Hewlett-Packard Sony
Blue C ro s s  Blue Shield Hom e D epot Sprint Nextel
Boeing Honeywell State Farm
BP IBM T-M obile
Cargill Inland Steel Taser International
Caterpillar International Paper T im e  W arner
C hevron JC  Penney U nion Pacific C orp
C hrys le r Joh n  D eere & Co. United A irlines
C IB A-GEIGY Jo h n s o n  & Joh n son United Health Group
C oca-Cola K12 Inc. UPS
C olum bia Healthcare Koch Industries U .S. Cham ber of Com m erce
C onn ections Academ y Kraft Food Verizon
C onso lidated  Edison Laidlaw V isa
C oo rs  Brewing C om pany Low e’s W ackenhut
C orrections C orp. o f Am erica M ary Kay C osm etics W al-M art
Cox C om m unications M cD onald 's W algreens
Crown Industries M cKinsey & Co. W ells Fargo
C VS Merck Yahoo!
Source: Adapted from table found in alexexposed.com.
members, ALEC trumpeted its operation as “a good investment” for corporate 
partners, adding that “nowhere else can you get a return that high.”57 When energy 
companies invest, ALEC lobbies against state and local environmental controls. 
When drug companies invest, it supports prohibiting imports of lower-cost drugs 
from Canada. When Coca-Cola invests, it lobbies against taxes on sugary soft
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drinks. When private prison operators invest, it advocates for policies that would 
raise occupancy rates, such as the detention of undocumented immigrants and 
the restriction of parole eligibility.58 And when payday loan companies invest, it 
opposes a law prohibiting such firms from charging more than 36 percent interest.59
But both ALEC and the Chamber also promote a broader economic and dereg- 
ulatory agenda that is not directly tied to the profitability of specific donors. They 
support cuts to “entitlements” such as Social Security, unemployment insurance, 
and food stamps; push for more trade agreements on the NAFTA model; seek to 
shrink public funding for schools; oppose paid sick leave and workplace safety 
regulations; and work to undermine labor unions and restrict their participation 
in political debates.60 Virtually all the initiatives described in this book— includ­
ing forced privatization, “right-to-work” laws, and abolition of minimum-wage 
and prevailing-wage laws— reflect model statutes developed by ALEC and pro­
moted through its network. Some of ALEC’s most powerful corporate mem­
bers are also active in the Chamber, and the Chamber itself is an active member 
of ALEC, as are Koch Industries, NFIB, and Americans for Prosperity. For all 
o f them, this dimension of the legislative agenda is aimed not at immediately 
enhancing specific companies’ revenues but at reshaping the underlying balance 
of power between workers and employers.
Much of the discussion of campaign finance in recent years has focused on the 
outsized influence of individual megadonors. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority 
of the ultrawealthy favor public policies that advance their economic interests. 
But individuals make poor subjects for political analysis. Some spend money on 
issues unrelated to their interests— such as Tom Steyer’s focus on climate change 
and Michael Bloomberg’s on gun control. Above all, an examination of individ­
ual donors leads to a focus on personal convictions, passion, or grudges, which 
are hard to predict— much less influence.
By contrast, the behavior of corporate lobbies is deliberate, rational, and 
impersonal. At some point, every major corporate contributor to ALEC con­
vened its government affairs or executive committee to decide to invest resources 
in the organization. This decision cannot have been the product of personal or 
ideological conviction unrelated to the company’s financial interests; given cor­
porate officers’ fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, we must assume that it 
was based on the belief that it served the company’s long-term interests.
In some cases— Coca-Cola’s opposition to restrictions on sugary soft drinks, 
for example— that interest is obvious. In others— restricting eligibility for unem­
ployment insurance or cutting school funding— it is less clear. These cases force 
us to probe more deeply to understand corporate goals. Likewise, when the 
country’s largest corporations unite to oppose Obamacare, promote guest work­
ers, limit lawsuits for race or sex discrimination, and slash public pensions and
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library budgets, we must make sense of how these policies fit together into a 
coherent agenda deemed to serve their self-interest.
For these reasons, this book focuses not on individual donors but on legisla­
tion promoted by one or more of the major corporate lobbies. The exception 
is the Koch brothers’ network of advocacy groups, represented at the state level 
primarily by Americans for Prosperity. While the Kochs may hold deep ideologi­
cal convictions, they do not act on convictions that are inconsistent with their 
business interests.61 Whereas other megadonors may focus on issues unrelated to their 
business— internet privacy, climate change, or marriage equality, for example— 
the Kochs focus solely on advancing an ambitious agenda to free corporate own­
ers from the burdens of taxation, regulation, and organized workers. Indeed, the 
Kochs have a history of employing senior staff who hold positions simultaneously 
in Koch Industries and in related foundations and advocacy groups in order to 
ensure that their advocacy funding is aligned with their financial interests. So 
too, Koch Industries’ lobbyists often work in close coordination with the staff of 
Koch-funded advocacy organizations.62
Furthermore, rather than simply contributing to candidates’ campaigns, the 
Kochs have established a uniquely broad network of related organizations— can­
didate selection and funding vehicles, think tanks, data firms, communications 
strategists, and grassroots organizers— that together constitute an integrated and 
formidable political force.63 In 2014, Americans for Prosperity alone spent $125 
million and had five hundred full-time staffers to organize supporters in target 
states.64 Finally, the Kochs not only spend their own money on an unparalleled 
scale; they also serve as organizers and directors of a network of corporate and 
private donors. In 2016, this network aimed to spend close to $1 billion, signifi­
cantly more than either the Democratic or Republican parties raised in the 2012 
election cycle.65 The ability to raise such sums, election after election, fundamen­
tally recalibrates the balance of power in electoral politics and must be taken into 
account in any effort to understand the corporate legislative agenda.
How Does Twenty-First-Century Corporate 
Politics Differ from What Came Before?
The effort to make sense of the corporate agenda also requires comprehend­
ing salient features of the historical context in which it is situated. The struggle 
between employers and employees— and the outsized influence o f business 
lobbies— is hardly new. Big business lobbies fought against the eight-hour day,66 
Social Security,67 and the minimum wage.68 An impressive body of scholarship 
has shown that the country’s big business lobbies have consistently sought to
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minimize or reverse the accomplishments of the New Deal, starting almost 
immediately after its inception.69 Yet the shape of the struggle changes, and we 
cannot understand corporate lobbies’ aims in the twenty-first century simply 
by examining their behavior in the 1940s or 1970s. Today’s corporate agenda is 
framed, in particular, by rising inequality, a shrunken “economic left,” and the 
impact of globalization and fmancialization on corporations’ strategic plans.
Not all scholars agree that there is such a thing as an overarching “corporate 
agenda” in politics. The historian Benjamin Waterhouse and the sociologist Mark 
Mizruchi argue that twenty-first-century corporations are unable to forge a col­
lective policy agenda beyond the particular interests of individual companies.70 
Indeed, there have been some notable disagreements among the corporate lob­
bies themselves. Americans for Prosperity, for example, opposes the Export- 
Import Bank and Common Core education standards, both of which the Cham­
ber of Commerce supports. ALEC itself has seen scores of companies drop out in 
recent years— first in the wake of the Trayvon Martin murder in Florida, a state 
where ALEC promoted “Stand Your Ground” laws, and then in response to the 
organization’s perceived opposition to climate change legislation. Similar defec­
tions have occurred at the Chamber of Commerce.71
Yet such disagreements also point to the centrality of the agenda described 
in this book. ALEC, the Chamber, NAM, NFIB, AFP, and the Club for Growth 
disagree on various policies, and they have sometimes endorsed opposing can­
didates in GOP primary elections. But they are fully united on attacking public- 
and private-sector unions, opposing minimum-wage laws and paid sick leave, 
restricting unemployment insurance, and supporting large tax cuts and perma­
nent restrictions on public spending. The fact that organizations that may fight 
over other issues come together around this agenda attests to its centrality: no 
corporation has ever resigned from ALEC because it disagreed with the organiza­
tion’s position on the minimum wage or paid sick leave.
Many observers have noted that corporate politics have shifted to the right. 
From the 1960s through the 1990s, the Chamber of Commerce and NAM 
represented what the sociologist William Domhoff terms the “ultraconser­
vative wing” of the corporate community, while the Business Roundtable 
comprised more moderately minded CEOs.72 In the twenty-first century, the 
Business Roundtable has shrunk almost to insignificance— its 2009-10 lobby­
ing budget was less than one-tenth that of the Chamber.73 At the same time, 
the Chamber and NAM have been outflanked on the right by Americans for 
Prosperity, FreedomWorks, and the Club for Growth. This historical shift, too, 
must be understood not simply as a product o f the Koch brothers’ personal 
ideology or as an expression o f a vaguely articulated Zeitgeist but as a reflec­
tion of structural economic changes.
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One o f the current economy’s distinguishing features is the degree of 
globalization to which it is subject, relative to earlier periods. It may never have 
been entirely true that “what’s good for General Motors is what’s good for the 
country,” as the company’s president apocryphally suggested in 1953.74 But the 
alignment between corporate and national interests was certainly much closer 
when companies relied on Americans both to make and to buy their products. 
Currently, a majority of GM employees and nearly two-thirds of the cars it sells 
are overseas, with the number of cars sold in China alone surpassing the U.S. 
total.75 General Motors remains highly engaged in American politics, as a mem­
ber of NAM’s board of directors, a partner of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
and an active member of ALEC.76 But this influence is now exercised on behalf 
of a company for which American workers’ skills and household incomes matter 
less than ever before.
GM’s situation is far from unique. For the first time, many of the country’s 
most powerful political actors are companies whose headquarters may be located 
in the United States but whose profitability does not primarily depend on the 
fortunes of American society. Foreign sales now account for 48 percent of the 
S8cP 500’s total corporate revenues.77 Among recent ALEC member corpora­
tions, Exxon Mobil, Caterpillar, Procter 8c Gamble, Pfizer, Dow Chemical, and 
IBM all earn more than 60 percent of their revenue outside the United States.78 
This marks a new departure in American politics: some of the most influential 
actors in the legislative process have political interests that are increasingly dis­
connected from the fate of the country’s citizens.
These interests have also been influenced by the dramatic growth of the finan­
cial sector relative to the economy as a whole— a process that has fundamentally 
reshaped corporate priorities. A series of legal and regulatory changes, beginning 
in the 1970s, gradually allowed pension funds to invest in stocks and higher-risk 
financial instruments; permitted savings and loans, commercial banks, insurance 
companies, and investment banks to merge their operations; and created a large 
market of unregulated investment instruments. Together, these changes triggered 
a wave of hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts and led nearly all publicly 
traded companies to reorient their operations in order to maximize short-term 
return to shareholders.79 Whether in response to shareholder demands or to pre­
empt takeover attempts by boosting earnings per share, the country’s premier 
corporations began diverting resources away from investment in plant, labor, 
or technology in order to free up cash for stock buybacks, increasingly generous 
dividends, and other investor payouts.80
As the economist Eileen Appelbaum and industrial relations scholar Rose­
mary Batt describe it, corporations have moved from “the ‘managerial business 
model’— in which returns are generated through productive activities overseen
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increasingly less able to provide collective solutions to issues of concern to the 
business community, and society, as a whole.”
The work of the Chamber of Commerce, ALEC, and allied organizations, how­
ever, suggests that there is no shortage of coordinated political action, including 
on broad social issues not tied to the bottom line of particular firms. What has 
changed is not the ability to act in concert but the underlying interests that shape 
corporate behavior. Mizruchi complains, for example, that “the corporate commu­
nity has been unable to provide a solution to the crisis” o f education. But what is a 
crisis for American citizens may simply not be one for many of the most powerful 
U.S.-based corporations. Rather than assuming corporations have become unable 
to formulate a coordinated response to shared problems, it is more fruitful to 
assume that the leading corporate lobbies are acting rationally—and then explore 
how and why the legislative agenda we are witnessing is deemed to serve their inter­
ests. In seeking to make sense of observed corporate behavior, we need to ask the 
right question, based on a clear-eyed understanding of the present: How might this 
behavior make sense under the current conditions of long-term decline, globaliza­
tion, financialization, a diminished left, and unrestricted money in politics?
Making Sense of Corporate Motives
The state legislative record provides a richly detailed account of the policy initia­
tives advanced by the big business lobbies. But how are we to make sense of these? 
If a state chamber of commerce advocates the expansion of charter schools, for 
example, is this because member companies are concerned they won’t have 
enough skilled labor to hire and see this as a means of solving that problem? 
Perhaps it is because charters are cheaper, and companies see them as a way to cut 
taxes, or because they have financial interests o f their own that will benefit from 
charter industry growth. Or is it simply because companies are concerned about 
American education and support this cause for the same reasons they donate to 
parks and hospitals?
More broadly, how should we understand what gives coherence to a state 
chamber of commerce’s disparate legislative priorities, or comprehend the 
motives behind legislation that has no immediate payoff for a particular mem­
ber’s bottom line? How we answer these questions shapes how we anticipate these 
actors’ initiatives— and thus how others might think about organizing on behalf 
of an alternative vision of the economy.
Both scholars and journalists have often characterized the most extreme cor­
porate proposals— abolishing the Department of Education, refusing to raise the 
federal debt limit, privatizing Medicare— as primarily the product of ideology.
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The most extensive academic research on the Tea Party and the Koch network 
has been carried out by a team of political scientists led by Harvard Univer­
sity’s Theda Skocpol. Skocpol’s book on the Tea Party, coauthored with Vanessa 
Williamson, distinguishes between “ ‘mainstream’ . . .  pro-business GOP circles” 
and organizations such as Freedom Works and Americans for Prosperity, which 
are deemed “advocacy groups . . .  ideological organizations first and foremost.”88 
But “ ideological” can have multiple meanings. Clearly, the work of the business 
lobbies is not ideological in the sense of reflecting a moral commitment that is 
completely unrelated to financial self-interest, as might be true of a billionaire 
supporter of marriage equality or opponent of abortion. Too often, the word 
“ideological” functions as a marker for the point where analysis ends: observers 
can no longer trace policy positions to obvious material interests, so they label 
what appears to be irrational or frivolous behavior ideological, turning the term 
into a catchall category for whatever they can’t explain otherwise.
While the convictions that people express may be sincerely held, they tend to 
be intertwined with our assessment of how they affect our interests. There are 
of course individuals who advocate passionately for policies that run counter to 
their financial interests. But they are the exception. And when it comes to deliber­
ate decisions by large corporations, as opposed to personal choices by individual 
donors, it is even less likely that political advocacy strays far from financial interests.
This does not mean that when corporate executives participate in policy 
debates, they are merely acting as a mouthpiece for shareholders. The experi­
ence o f running a company might very well nurture a heartfelt belief that society 
would be better off if one’s firm didn’t have to contend with labor negotiations 
or government regulation. At the same time, those whose personal views coincide 
with corporate goals are more likely to be promoted to higher levels o f author­
ity; to the extent that these views diverge from the company’s interests, they are 
revised or discarded. This is why, in order to understand or anticipate corporate 
political activity, it is more fruitful to examine business models and profit strate­
gies than to plumb the personal worldviews of senior managers.
This is true even of the Koch brothers, often considered emblematic of the 
most ideological of corporate interests. Even their behavior expresses no passion­
ate convictions that run counter to or are disembodied from their financial inter­
ests.89 Many observers note that the brothers come from a family of ideologues: 
their father, Fred Koch, was a founding member of the John Birch Society. Yet his 
sons, unlike him, do not advocate white supremacy or homophobia; on the con­
trary, they have launched an initiative to recruit Latino voters into the Republican 
camp, and David Koch has declared his support for marriage equality. Whatever 
the Kochs may think privately, their public behavior has almost nothing to do 
with the social conservatism trumpeted by their father.90
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Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez define the Kochs as “individuals who take 
philosophical and normative ideas as well as material interests very seriously,” 
suggesting that they oppose public employee unions “in part because they see 
all unions as distortions of the ‘free market.’”91 But the Kochs’ actual behavior 
is rife with contradictions of these supposedly bedrock principles. Koch Indus­
tries took maximum advantage of federal subsidies for their oil and pipeline 
businesses— even engaging lobbyists to ensure these perks stayed in the federal 
budget.92 The brothers presumably oppose Iran’s form of government but never­
theless employed a foreign subsidiary to sell oil equipment to the country in dis­
regard of U.S. sanctions.93 According to testimony from one longtime employee, 
Koch Industries followed a standard practice of cheating customers in measur­
ing quantities of gas bought and sold; the company paid $20 million to settle 
one lawsuit charging it with stealing oil by this method from a Native American 
reservation.94 None of this describes the behavior of a company that is, above all, 
committed to the principles of a fair and free market. Most telling is the brothers’ 
position on the 2008 Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), the bank bailout 
that served as a prime focus for conservatives’ antigovernment rage. Americans 
for Prosperity initially opposed TARP as an unwarranted government intrusion 
in the market. But in September 2008, the stock market suffered its largest ever 
single-day decline, threatening the Kochs’ own financial interests. Within forty- 
eight hours, the Kochs had switched sides, and AFP signed on to a letter urging 
U.S. senators to support TARP’s adoption.95
Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez focus on disagreements between the Kochs and 
the Chamber of Commerce— which they characterize as a clash between “ideo­
logical groups” and “corporate priorities”— as evidence that the GOP’s rightward 
move is driven by principled rather than economic motives.96 Yet even these con­
flicts may have less to do with ideology than with competing corporate interests. 
The authors single out debate over reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank as 
the leading example of the Kochs’ insistence on ideological purity at the expense 
of economic interests. Koch Industries was determined to block reauthorization, 
these scholars suggest, because it “views the . . .  Bank as antithetical to the free 
market principles it pursues.”97 But a 2015 report from the Koch-funded Mercatus 
Center offers an alternative explanation. The bank subsidizes sales of large capital 
goods produced in the United States—but only if purchased by foreign buyers. 
Half of the largest sales subsidized by the bank are to foreign energy firms that com­
pete with Koch Industries—which, as an American-based firm, is ineligible for the 
subsidies. “These foreign concerns,” the report concludes, “are collecting subsidies 
from American taxpayers.. . .  The federal government [thus] disadvantages U.S. 
energy firms.”98 What appears as an ideological difference, then, may simply reflect 
commercial conflicts of interest between competing business sectors.
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The key to understanding the Koch brothers’ public-policy priorities and 
choice of candidates to back is ultimately found on Koch Industries’ bottom 
line. The family firm had good reasons to oppose the Obama administration and 
Democratic lawmakers. Proposals to reverse the Bush tax cuts for the wealthi­
est Americans or to regulate the derivatives industry would strike heavily at the 
Kochs’ personal wealth and at a core component of their business." Most impor­
tant, efforts to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions pose a significant threat to the 
company’s profits.100 Indeed, as far back as 1993, the Kochs funded Citizens for a 
Sound Economy (a precursor to FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity) 
to organize rallies against a BTU tax proposed by the Clinton administration. 
Starting with the first Tea Party Tax Day, AFP worked hard to integrate energy 
interests into the movement, distributing talking points declaring that “the 
Obama budget proposes the largest excise tax in history, disguised as a cap-and- 
trade energy scheme.” 101 In 2010, AFP organized a No Climate Tax initiative that 
called on GOP candidates to pledge never to support climate change legislation; 
five hundred candidates signed.102 Legislative responses to climate change are a 
concern for the Kochs at the state level as well. After AFP helped elect right-wing 
Republicans to the New Hampshire legislature, for example, one of the victors’ 
first acts in early 2011 was to pull the state out of the New England Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, effectively ending a regional effort to control carbon 
emissions.103
Furthermore, even these most extreme of corporate advocates are not so com­
mitted to ideological purity that they would rather lose elections than compro­
mise. Again, Skocpol and Williamson’s otherwise insightful book gets this point 
wrong, contrasting Karl Rove’s “electability-over-principles” approach with the 
Kochs’ supposed political intransigence.104 In fact, the Kochs’ behavior appears 
entirely pragmatic; it is simply aimed at different goals. AFP, for example, was so 
enthusiastic about Paul Ryan’s 2010 budget proposal— including gradual priva­
tization of Medicare— that votes on that proposal were used as a political litmus 
test to determine which members of Congress the organization would support.105 
However, when that proposal proved broadly unpopular (it was blamed for los­
ing the GOP a congressional seat in a May 2011 special election in upstate New 
York), its backers concluded that Medicare privatization was a bridge too far.106 
None of the organizations that supported it in principle— including the Heri­
tage Foundation and AFP— retained it as a central feature of the 2012 election 
cycle.107 Similarly, though Mitt Romney was far from the Kochs’ top choice for 
president, once he secured the GOP nomination, AFP endorsed and campaigned 
for him.108
Whereas getting Republicans elected may be more important to Rove than 
locking down what they will do once in office, the Kochs and the rest o f the
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“extreme” corporate right are first and foremost committed to corporate- 
friendly policies. This has created political fissures and competitive primaries. 
But the Kochs are no less pragmatic than Rove; they simply make different calcu­
lations regarding how far right candidates can go and still win. And the electoral 
record suggests that the two sides may have equal claims to realism. In 2010, 
for example, half of the Tea Party candidates for the U.S. Senate won, and half 
lost.109 The Kochs’ aim remains to enact laws and change policies— not to speak 
truth to power while falling on their sword. What distinguishes the “mainstream” 
Chamber of Commerce from the “radical” Kochs is not pragmatism but ambi­
tion. The Kochs and the Chamber largely share the same economic vision— low 
taxes, little regulation, few public services, and no unions. What sets the Kochs 
apart is their belief that it is feasible to realize this vision with bold leaps rather 
than incremental steps.
A Revolution of Falling Expectations
Rapidly widening economic inequality and long-term uncertainty for a growing 
number of Americans have produced widespread anxiety, resentment, and rage, 
which in turn create a politics that is combustible and unpredictable. Anger is 
voiced in many directions: against banks and insurance companies, against public 
employees, and against immigrants. The result is a politics rife with contradictions. 
In 2012, for instance, 75 percent of Montanans voted to do away with corporate 
personhood, but 55 percent voted for Mitt Romney, who defended it; a majority of 
New Jersey voters support a significant increase in the state’s minimum wage, but 
a majority also supported Governor Chris Christie, who vetoed the move.110 Large 
majorities think both that big government is a problem and that the country’s 
wealth should be much more evenly distributed.111 At the height of the Occupy 
Wall Street protests, nearly 20 percent of Republicans— and one-tenth of Tea 
Partiers— supported the protest movement.112 And multiple accounts described 
voters torn between backing Donald Trump or Bernie Sanders in 2016.113
For the corporate lobbies, growing inequality poses a central political chal­
lenge: how to advance policies that are bound to exacerbate inequality while 
avoiding a populist backlash. ALEC and Chamber of Commerce lobbyists are 
aware that much of their agenda is broadly unpopular. This problem was par­
ticularly acute in the heat of the 2008 financial crisis and during the onset of the 
Great Recession. Most of the country blamed the financial crisis on insufficient 
government regulation.114 An overwhelming majority—including three-quarters 
of Republicans—believed the government should ban bonuses in banks that 
received federal assistance.115 And nearly 60 percent of the public believed that
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the government should limit compensation for all corporate executives, regard­
less of whether they had received federal bailout money."6 Throughout 2007-9, 
a significant majority of Americans not only supported a “public option” for 
health insurance but wanted a single-payer system.117 Finally, for at least a decade, 
two-thirds of the country has consistently held that corporations pay too little 
in taxes; in 2015, a majority supported the proposition that “our government 
should . . .  redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.”118
The corporate lobbies, understandably nervous about managing these sen­
timents, have sought to channel economic resentment in benign directions by 
positioning themselves as the voice of the disenfranchised. The Koch brothers, for 
example, have created an organization called Generation Opportunity, dedicated 
to recruiting millennials to the conservative camp. Rather than insisting that the 
future is bright, the organization’s message targets young people’s anxiety and 
anger, which it tries to redirect toward government. “We are the only generation 
in American history to be left worse off than the last one,” the organization’s pitch 
proclaims. “We are paying more for college tuition, for a Social Security system 
and a Medicare system we won’t get to use, $18 trillion in national debt and now 
an Obamacare system— all that steals from our generation’s paychecks.”119 Simi­
larly, a 2015 FreedomWorks fund-raising appeal sought to turn anticorporate 
sentiment to its advantage, arguing that “while the left is funded by a few rich cor­
porations or billionaires, we’re funded by tens of thousands of patriots like you.”120
In an environment in which populist backlash poses a constant source of con­
cern, it is not enough for the corporate lobbies to draft and advocate for legis­
lation that is narrowly self-interested. They must also anticipate and preempt 
popular challenges to rising inequality. The record o f corporate legislative action 
suggests that this concern has been embodied in four types of initiatives:
• Laws that constrain or abolish the institutional vehicles through which 
working people seek to challenge corporate power. This includes not only 
the elimination of labor unions but also restrictions on citizens’ right to sue 
for corporate malfeasance and limits on government’s authority to regulate 
corporate behavior.
• Privatization of public services, thereby removing focal points around which 
protest might coalesce. If no public authority is responsible for libraries or 
bus service, all grievances and demands become customer-service issues 
rather than policy problems that must be addressed by democratically 
accountable officials.
• Initiatives to restrict the public’s right to vote on redistributive policies, 
making it illegal for city councils to vote on regulating fracking, policing 
wage theft, or raising the minimum wage.
